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Homelessness,  empowerment  and  self-reliance  in  Scotland  and  Ireland:  the  impact  of 
legal rights to housing for homeless people 
 
Abstract  
This paper explores the impact of legal rights to housing for homeless people, focusing on 
their  capacity  to  ‘empower’  those  experiencing  homelessness.  Lukes’  (2005)  three-
dimensional view of power, complemented by Bourdieu's (1972) concept of ‘habitus’, is 
used to distinguish between conceptualisations of empowerment. A distinction is drawn 
between ‘traditional’ understandings of empowerment, which focus on people’s capacity to 
realise their ‘subjective interests’, and on understandings that foreground ‘real interests’. 
These latter ‘radical’ perspectives direct attention to people’s ‘habitus’ – their internalised 
dispositions to perceive situations and act in particular ways. Empirically, the paper draws 
on  a  qualitative  comparison  of  approaches  to  homelessness  in  Scotland  and  Ireland. 
Whereas in Scotland virtually all those who are homeless now have a legal right to settled 
accommodation,  Ireland  has  rejected  such  a  ‘legalistic’  approach,  pursuing  a  consensus 
driven ‘social partnership’ model. Based on primary research with national experts, service 
providers  and  homeless  single  men  it  both  countries,  it  is  argued  that  legal  rights  can 
effectively empower homeless people. These findings call into question popular and political 
understandings of the relationship between legal welfare rights and self-reliance.  
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Introduction  
 
Energy and self-dependence are ... liable to be impaired by the absence of help, as well as by its 
excess. It is even more fatal to exertion to have no hope of succeeding by it, than to be assured of 
succeeding without it. When the condition of any one is so disastrous that his energies are 
paralyzed by discouragement, assistance is a tonic, not a sedative (John Stuart Mill, 1848: 354-
355). 
 
There are opposing perspectives regarding the relationship between legal rights to welfare 
and the empowerment of marginalised groups. On the one hand, legal welfare rights offer 
to  mitigate  inequality  by  ‘decommodifying’  certain  key  social  goods  and  services.  In 
addition, such rights offer to overcome the disadvantages of official discretion, which has 
been criticised for facilitating arbitrary decision-making; leaving welfare recipients uncertain 
of  the  assistance  they  will  receive  and  thus  insecure;  and  necessitating  intrusion  into 
welfare recipients’ private lives in search of reasons to use discretion one way or another 
(Donnison, 1977; Goodin, 1986). On this view, legal rights to welfare promise to empower 
disadvantaged  groups,  meeting  social  needs  through  clear  mechanisms,  supported  by 
channels of accountability that provide welfare recipients with an effective sanction against 
providers.  Such  rights  establish  a  counter-hierarchy  of  power,  providing  a  weapon  for 
challenging inequalities (Lister, 2004).  
 
This  account  of  the  relationship  between  legal  welfare  rights  and  empowerment  has, 
however,  been  challenged  from  the  perspective  of  those  wishing  to  transform  welfare 
states  into  tools  to  promote  independence  and  self-reliance,  rather  than  'permissive' 
institutions that license dependence (Goodin, 1985;  Mead, 1986; King, 2006). From this   2 
perspective, welfare policies must be designed to ‘responsibilise’ and ‘activate’ citizens, to 
help  people  –  and  communities  –  help  themselves  (Giddens,  1994;  Pathak,  2013). 
Accordingly, the argument that legal welfare rights are empowering is turned on its head, 
with such rights seen instead to risk disempowering individuals, casting them as passive 
recipients of state beneficence rather than active ‘autotelic’ responsible citizens. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by focusing on the impact of legal rights to 
housing for homeless people. First, it seeks to unpack the concept of ‘empowerment’ via a 
critical interrogation of the underlying concept of 'power'. In considering whether certain 
policies are empowering or not, it is ventured that  attention must be paid to both the 
capacity  of  disadvantaged  groups  to  realise  their  subjective  interests,  but  also  to  more 
subtle dynamics concerning the dispositions of those using welfare services and discourses 
around  homelessness.  Second,  it  applies  this  conceptual  framework  to  the  practical 
question of whether – and in what ways – legal rights to housing for homeless people are 
empowering  or  disempowering.  It  does  so  by  drawing  on  primary  research  involving 
national key informants, service providers and single homeless men in Scotland, which has 
established a strong legal rights-based approach to homelessness, and Ireland, which has 
rejected legal rights in favour of a ‘social partnership’ model. The paper closes by suggesting 
that legal welfare rights, as implemented in Scotland, can be effective tools for empowering 
homeless  people,  and  moreover  that  they  have  the  potential  to  support  rather  than 
undermine self-reliance. However, such positive results are predicated on the bluntness and 
simplicity  of  those  rights,  factors  that  must  be  taken  into  account  in  considering  the 
applicability of these findings to contexts beyond Scotland.  
 
Conceptualising empowerment  
The imprecision of the idea of ‘empowerment’ has been noted elsewhere (Baistow, 1994; 
Starkey, 2003; Lister, 2004). The concept has been described as ‘ambiguous and flexible 
enough in its meanings to allow many possible interpretations whilst, at the same time, 
carrying  with  it  a  stamp  of  ethical  creditability  that  rubs-off  on  those  who  ’empower’’ 
(Baistow, 1994: 45). This point remains pertinent in a context where empowerment can be 
claimed as an objective by those seeking to advance legal welfare rights and those seeking 
to circumscribe them in order to promote self-reliance. Unlike ‘empowerment’, the concept 
of ‘power’ has been subject to extensive theorisation, but nevertheless remains ‘essentially 
contested’  (Lukes,  2005).  This  section  uses  Lukes  ‘three-dimensional  view’  of  power, 
supplemented by Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus, to conceptualise empowerment.  
 
One-dimensional  power  can  be  located  by  observing  who  succeeds  ‘in  the  making  of 
decisions  on  issues  over  which  there  is  an  observable  conflict  of  (subjective)  interests’ 
(Lukes, 2005: 19). Those who hold power can be identified by observing whose preferences 
are  served  or  interests  realised  in  such  situations.  Conflicts  of  interest/preference 
(understood as synonymous) therefore offer an ‘experimental test of power attributions’ 
(Lukes, 2005: 17). Power can also be exercised ‘by confining the scope of decision-making to 
relatively ‘safe’ issues’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 948). In these cases, conflicts of interest 
will  be  latent  and  harder  to  observe.  Such  agenda-setting  power  constitutes  the  two-
dimensional view of power (Lukes, 2005). On the one- and two-dimensional views, power 
can  be  exercised  through  several  mechanisms:  force,  coercion,  influence  and  authority 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Lukes, 2005). Of particular relevance in the context of welfare   3 
services is the mechanism of coercion, that is, securing compliance through the threat of 
deprivation. 
Lukes’ ‘three-dimensional’ view of power rests on the insight that people will not necessarily 
express or be conscious of their ‘real interests’, and thus on a distinction between subjective 
preferences  and  real  interests.  To  assume  genuine  consensus  from  the  absence  of 
grievances ignores the possibility of a manipulated consensus. On this ‘radical’ view, power 
may  not  be  revealed  in  decision-making  situations,  but  is  secured  by  shaping  people’s 
‘perceptions, cognitions and preferences’ (Lukes, 2005: 28), their ‘internalized dispositions’ 
(Brubaker, 2004: 43). Its mechanisms – including processes of socialization, indoctrination 
and the production of discourse – render it harder still to observe than two-dimensional 
power.  
The  distinction  between  subjective  and  real  interests  is  contentious,  in  that  it  requires 
imputing interests to someone that they do not recognise (Polsby, 1963; Berlin, 1958/2002). 
Objections to this apparent paternalism were articulated forcefully by Berlin in his essay 
‘Two concepts of liberty’: 
 
if the essence of men [sic] is that they are autonomous beings… then nothing is worse than to 
treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects, played on by causal influences, 
creatures at the mercy of external stimuli, whose choices can be manipulated by their rulers, 
whether by threats of force or offers of rewards. To treat men in this way is to treat them as if 
they  were  not  self-determined…  as  if  they  were  not  free,  but  human  material  for  me,  the 
benevolent reformer to mould in accordance with my own, not their, freely adopted purpose 
(1958/2002: 183).  
Lukes defends the distinction between subjective and real interests, acknowledging that 
people’s interests are ‘many, conflicting and of different kinds’ (Lukes, 2005: 147) and thus 
that specifying ‘real interests’ is inherently problematic. He suggests that ‘real interests’ are 
taken to be ‘a function of one’s explanatory purpose, framework and methods, which in 
turn have to be justified’ (Lukes, 2005: 148). Real interests might therefore be understood 
as a set of central capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000) or basic needs (Doyal and Gough, 1991). 
Nussbaum herself appears to acknowledge the distinction when she questions whether an 
Indian women’s endorsement of ‘traditions of modesty, purity and self-abnegation’ should 
be the last word in a context where she has no property rights, no education, no right to 
divorce  and  faces  the  risk  of  violence  if  she  seeks  employment  outside  the  home 
(Nussbaum, 2000: 43).  
 
Foucault (1980) and Bourdieu (1972/1977) have advanced other, highly influential ‘radical’ 
views of power. Of particular relevance is Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, which describes ‘a 
system  of  durable  and transposable  dispositions  which,  integrating  all past  experiences, 
functions  at  every  moment  as  a  matrix  of  perceptions,  appreciations,  and  actions’ 
(Bourdieu,  1972/1977:  261).  Habitus  describes  how  society  becomes  ‘sedimented’  in  a 
person  as  propensities  to  think,  feel  and  act  in  certain  ways  in  particular  situations 
(Wacquant,  2004).  Bourdieu  further  distinguishes  between  various  forms  of  capital 
(economic, cultural, social, symbolic), which yield power for those who hold them. Symbolic 
capital is the form taken by all types of capital when their possession is seen as legitimate. It 
is not perceived as power ‘but as a source of legitimate demands on the services of others’   4 
(Brubaker, 2004: 40). Bourdieu and Lukes’ perspectives both highlight how power can lead 
people to ‘accept their role in the existing order of things… because they can see or imagine 
no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable’ (Lukes, 2005: 28).   
 
The one- and two-dimensional (or ‘traditional’) perspectives discussed above indicate that 
interactions between those who use and provide welfare services can be understood as 
‘power situations’ in that there is a potential conflict of interest between these parties. In 
the context of homelessness, a homeless person’s interests can in part be understood as 
having  their  housing  need  (for  settled  housing  of  an  adequate  quality)  met.  Those 
administering  welfare  services  are  likely  to  have  a  plurality  of  objectives  (reflecting the 
plurality of objectives embodied within welfare institutions generally) (Hoggett, 2006). They 
are likely to be motivated to act in the ‘public interest’ (however defined); to respond to 
managerially/legally  imposed  rules  (e.g.  to  ration  resources/prioritise  certain  cases);  to 
minimise  the  stress/workload  associated  with  their  role;  and/or to  (de)prioritise  certain 
groups  according  to  their  own  perceptions  of  justice/desert  (Lipsky,  1980;  Jeffers  and 
Hoggett, 1995). While these objectives may in specific cases be congruent with the interests 
of service users, it is highly likely that conflicts of interest between welfare providers and 
individual users will frequently occur. Empowering those who are homeless would therefore 
require either enabling self-reliance (thus avoiding or minimising the length of the ‘power 
situation’ of welfare interactions) or – drawing on the typology of mechanisms of power 
offered above – reducing the coercive power of the service provider within the welfare 
interaction
1.  The coercive power of the provider constitutes   their capacity to threaten 
deprivation and thus reducing it would involve reducing their discretion to decide not to 
meet the homeless person’s housing needs.  
 
The  ‘radical’  view  of  power,  on  the  other  hand,  suggest  that  ‘empowering’  those 
experiencing  homelessness  would  involve  attending  to  the  subtle  ways  in  which 
dispositions,  cognitions  and  preferences  influence  people’s  perceptions  of  their  own 
interests,  as  well  as  the  nature  and  outcomes  of  welfare  interactions.  Considering  how 
freedom can be understood if people’s dispositions are shaped by society through past 
experiences (as Bourdieu argues), Hilgers proposes that freedom ‘resides in *a person’s+ 
ability to objectivize his or her own condition… *Through+ a reflexive effort, they identify and 
begin  the  work  of  gaining  (relative)  control  over  their  own  disposition’  (2009:  738). 
Empowerment  then  might  be  understood  in  terms  of  ‘critical  autonomy’  –  a  person’s 
capacity to ‘question and to participate in agreeing or changing the rules’ (Doyal and Gough, 
1991: 67). Hoggett (2001) makes a distinction between ‘radical’ agency – through which 
rules or discourses can be challenged – and ‘limited’ agency – which seeks change within 
existing rules/discourse. Prior (2009) speaks of oppositional or ‘counter-agency’ in similar 
terms. 
 
This paper now seeks to apply the understandings of empowerment developed above to the 
policy approaches to homelessness policy pursued in Scotland and Ireland. The next section 
describes  these  contrasting  policy  approaches  and  puts  Scotland’s  legal  rights-based 
approach  in  an  international  context.  This  is  followed  by  an  account  of  the  methods 
employed in this study.  
 
Legal rights to housing for homeless people   5 
Legal rights to accommodation for homeless people are unusual internationally (Fitzpatrick 
and Stephens, 2007). Where they exist, they tend to entitle those who are literally roofless 
to emergency accommodation. Enforceable rights to settled accommodation are rarer still, 
with  the  only  clear  examples  being  the  French  ‘DALO’  (‘enforceable  right  to  housing’) 
introduced in 2007 (Houard and Lévy-Vroelant, 2013) and the UK statutory homelessness 
legislation  established  in  1977  (Fitzpatrick  et  al.,  2012).  Although  legal  rights-based 
approaches to homelessness are rare, something of an orthodoxy has developed in their 
favour (Anderson, 2009; Kenna, 2005; Loison-Leruste and Quilgars, 2009; Fitzpatrick and 
Watts, 2010; FEANTSA, 2012; Bratt et al., 2009), despite a paucity of empirical evidence.  
 
Devolution  has  led  to  significant  divergence  in  homelessness  policy  across  the  UK 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2012). Developments in Scotland have been particularly noteworthy. The 
focal  point  of  reforms  has  been  the  phasing  out  of  the  ‘priority  need  category’.  Since 
December  2012  virtually  all  homeless  people  in  Scotland  have  been  entitled  to  settled 
housing secured by their local authority, a duty normally discharged through the allocation 
of  a  social  housing  tenancy  (Fitzpatrick  et  al.,  2012).  Under  previous  UK  legislation  the 
priority need category was the key rationing device, meaning that only a subset of homeless 
households  (those  including  children,  pregnant  women  and  those  deemed  specifically 
‘vulnerable’) were entitled to settled housing. While the UK statutory framework has been 
criticised as complex, qualified and ‘hardly a prize of citizenship’ (Mullins and Niner, 1998; 
Cowan, 1999), from an international perspective the legislation is strikingly robust, in that 
the definition of homelessness is wide and the rights legally enforceable through domestic 
courts (Fitzpatrick and Watts, 2010). By expanding these rights to a wider group, Scotland 
has  established  what  is  generally  considered  an  exceptionally  progressive  approach  to 
homelessness (Pawson and Davidson, 2008; Anderson, 2012).  
 
Ireland is useful comparator through which to consider the difference legal rights make to 
experiences  of  homelessness.  Like  Scotland,  Ireland  is  a  relatively  small  jurisdiction 
considered to operate broadly as a ‘liberal’ welfare regime and has also pursued ambitious 
reforms to homelessness policy over the last 15 years. In contrast to Scotland however, Irish 
reforms  have  been  rooted  in  ‘a  consensual  or  negotiated  problem-solving  approach’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2008) between key ‘social partners’. This reflects a resistance to responses to 
social problems founded on justiciable rights (O’Donnell, 2003). Legal rights to housing for 
homeless people were explicitly rejected in the mid-1980s (Harvey, 2008), with an ambitious 
reform programme initiated in the late 1990s in the hope that a ‘low key, incremental’ 
approach  ‘may  provide more  robust  and  intended  outcomes  than  those  offered by  the 
legalistic route’ (O’Sullivan, 2008: 229). The main tenets of the Irish model are an emphasis 
on  strong  partnership  working  between  statutory  and  voluntary  organisation  in  the 
homelessness sector, coordinated by the Homeless Initiative in Dublin (established in 1996, 
now  the  Dublin  Region  Homelessness  Executive)  and  from  1998,  a  Cross-Departmental 
Team on Homelessness.  
 
This ‘social partnership’ ethos has also characterised the reconfiguration of Dublin services 
initiated in 2009, aiming to shift away from emergency accommodation provision to offering 
sustainable and long-term solutions to homelessness (O’Sullivan, 2012). This strategic shift 
from a ‘housing-ready’ approach (according to which homeless  people must prove their 
readiness  for  settled  housing  before  being  able  to  access  it)  towards  a  ‘housing-led’   6 
approach appears to bring Ireland partially in line with Scottish approaches, albeit outwith a 
framework of legal rights.    
 
Methods 
The study combined two phases of fieldwork. First, interviews were conducted (in late 2010) 
with  national  key  informants  working  in  the  fields  of  homelessness  and  social  housing, 
across the statutory and voluntary sector and within academia (Scotland: 10, Ireland: 13). 
Participants were purposively sampled in discussion with well-placed academic contacts, 
and  participants  with  a  diversity  of  perspectives  –  both  ‘insiders’  (involved  in  policy 
formulation)  and  ‘outsiders’  (those  not  involved  in  policy  formulation  and/or  critical  of 
current  approaches)  –  were  sought.  Further  participants  were  selected  on  the 
recommendation  of  initial  interviewees  (‘snowball’  sampling).  These  interviews  explored 
participants’ perceptions of the rationale and objectives of national policy, its success in 
achieving those objectives, and its drawbacks.  
 
The second phase of fieldwork (in 2011)  constituted two local case studies in Edinburgh and 
Dublin,  cities  selected  as  ‘exemplars’  of  national  homelessness  policy  (responses  to 
homelessness are widely acknowledged as most advanced in Dublin; Edinburgh was the only 
local authority in Scotland to receive a top 'A' grade in baseline inspections of homelessness 
services (Communities Scotland, 2006)). Interviews or small focus groups were conducted 
with service providers (Dublin n=8; Edinburgh n=10). Initial participants were recommended 
by national key informants, with further participants ‘snow-ball sampled’. Perspectives were 
sought from statutory and voluntary sector providers both in favour and critical of current 
approaches.  Interviews  explored  experiences  of  implementing  homelessness  policy  and 
perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach.  
 
Interviews  were  also  conducted  with  currently  homeless  men  residing  in  emergency 
homeless  hostels  or  recently  homeless  men  now  residing  in  social  or  privately  rented 
accommodation  (Dublin  n=15,  Edinburgh  n=11).  Around  two  thirds  of  participants  were 
currently  and  one third  recently  homeless  (within the  last  18  months).  The duration  of 
homelessness  experienced  by  participants  ranged  from  several  months  up  to  7  years. 
Focusing on single men (to the exclusion of other household types and women) enabled a 
detailed comparison of their specific experiences
2. Scottish reforms brought single homeless 
households (without any specific ‘vulnerability’) into the statutory safety-net for the first 
time, making their experiences as ‘rights-bearers’ particularly significant. This focus also 
provided a means of accounting for varying official definitions of homelessness in Scotland 
and Ireland (in practice, Ireland’s definition is somewhat narrower than Scotland’s). 
 
Participants were accessed through three different homeless services (hostels or support 
agencies) in each city, on the recommendation of national and local informants. Sampling 
was ‘opportunistic’ within constraints defined by a purposive sampling strategy: Irish/UK 
nationals over the age of 18 were sought in Dublin/Edinburgh respectively, and in Edinburgh 
only men owed the ‘main homelessness duty’ were included (fieldwork occurred prior to 
the full elimination of the ‘priority need’ category). The risk of staff suggesting only service 
users with positive experiences of services was minimised by emphasising the importance of 
gathering a range of perspectives and because the research sought to evaluate national 
policy  rather  than  specific  services.  Interviews  focused  on  experiences  of  and  attitudes   7 
towards accessing homelessness services, perceptions of the quality of support received and 
of the (temporary and settled) accommodation accessed. All interviews were transcribed 
and thematically coded and analysed using Atlas-Ti.  
 
The next section presents the empirical findings of this study, focusing on three themes 
prompted by the conceptual framework developed above. The next two sections focus on 
understandings  of  empowerment  suggested  by  the  traditional  view  of  power:  first,  the 
impact of legal rights on self-reliance and personal responsibility and second, the impact of 
legal rights on the discretion (or coercive power) of service providers.  The third section 
considers the impact of legal rights on empowerment on the radical view, focusing on how 
they affect the dispositions and attitudes of providers and users and broader discourses 
around homelessness. 
 
Legal rights and self-reliance  
Legal rights to welfare have increasingly tended to be seen as injurious to self-reliance in 
that they risk lessening the need for people to take personal responsibility for their own 
wellbeing (Mead, 1986; Giddens, 1994; King, 2006). On this reasoning, according to the 
‘traditional’  view  of  power,  Scotland’s  legal  rights  might  be  expected  to  disempower 
homeless men relative their Irish counterparts, who will face greater incentives to be self-
reliant. This study suggests some support for this view, among professionals in the sector 
and homeless men themselves. As will be seen however, a multi-dimensional consideration 
of the impact of the legal rights on empowerment undermines this conclusion.  
 
Though Scottish key informants tended to be supportive of the rights-based model, some 
emphasised that in applying as homeless, people ‘surrender quite a lot of control’ (National 
stakeholder, voluntary sector, Scotland). Echoing this, another Scottish stakeholder doubted 
that  how  ‘people  are  herded  into  situations  through  the  homeless  route  actually  does 
empower them at all’ (National stakeholder, social housing sector, Scotland). While these 
comments  appear  to  focus  on  the  impact  of  legal  rights  on  autonomy,  another  key 
informant went further, arguing that legal rights:  
  
Risk… taking away any incentive for people to take more responsibility for their own housing 
situation and the danger *is+ that systems… are set up for people who need their hands held, 
need everything done for them (National stakeholder, Scotland). 
 
Resistance to rights-based approaches predominated in Ireland, among both professionals 
and service users (though notably, an academic and several voluntary sector informants 
were strongly pro legal-rights) and tended to focus on issues of self-reliance and personal 
responsibility.  Echoing  the  concern  with  autonomy  articulated  above,  one  national 
stakeholder saw a tension between ‘the notion of people being the bearers of very defined 
rights *… and+ the notion that they should have some authorship of their own lives and… of 
what those rights should mean’ (National stakeholder, Ireland). Other Irish participants saw 
a  further  tension  between  rights  and  personal  responsibility.  A  Dublin  statutory  service 
provider described their opposition to rights-based approaches in these terms, explaining 
that  they  would  be  ‘much  more  in  favour  of  encouraging  people’s  ability  to  take 
responsibility and accountability and taking charge of their own life’. This sentiment was 
even echoed by some homeless men in Dublin who favoured the ‘stricter’ Irish response as   8 
better responding to ‘human nature’, by leaving the onus on the individual to resolve their 
situation. Reflecting on the Scottish approach, one Dublin hostel resident commented:  
 
over there that sounds a bit like they’re doing all the work for you, that to me… that’s creating a 
bit of laziness… Over here, you’re doing a bit of the work yourself… given human nature, you’ll 
respect it more… *and+ chances are you’ll hold onto it more. 
 
These perspectives suggest that legal rights fail to encourage those who are homeless to 
‘produce the conditions of [their] own independence’ (Clarke, 2005: 451). While they may 
meet housing needs (Watts, 2013), according to some they problematically cast homeless 
people as passive recipients of welfare, rather than self-reliant citizens. There are several 
problems with drawing this conclusion however.  First, some participants suggested that 
enabling access to settled accommodation should be the focus of homelessness services, 
even at the expense of promoting self-reliance. Thus, to conclude that Scotland’s legal rights 
undermine self-reliance among homeless men is not to make a decisive case against the 
approach. This chimes with normative arguments that claims to meet basic needs are prior 
to demands for self-reliance (Doyal and Gough, 1991; White, 2003). 
 
Second, while some participants felt Scottish homelessness policy undermines autonomy 
and  self-reliance,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  Ireland’s  approach  does  any  better  on  this 
standard. The homeless men involved in this study faced substantial barriers into settled 
accommodation and reported spending long periods in temporary accommodation (Watts, 
2013), echoing other reviews of homelessness services in Dublin (Homeless Agency, 2008). 
It  was  common  for  those  interviewed  to  describe  being  ‘stuck  in  a  rut’  in  temporary 
accommodation of ‘just of not doing anything’. This seemed to result from a combination of 
learning to live with this kind of environment and having no clear route  out of it. One 
participant described his state of mind when in temporary accommodation:  
 
I’m homeless, that’s the way it is, it was meant to be, you don’t see any light, you know? It’s kind 
of a hopeless state of mind, everything’s negative, you’re like a robot doing day-to-day stuff (Ex-
service user, Dublin). 
 
The Irish service user quoted above, concerned that legal rights in Scotland may ‘create 
laziness’, described how he ‘got very lazy’ in one hostel where he lived for almost 6 years. 
During this time, he had little support to move into settled accommodation. Whilst the 
perspective outlined above would predict that his self-reliance would be enhanced in this 
situation, this did not reflect his own account of his experiences. As demonstrated below, 
this experience of being stuck in a rut and of ‘getting lazy’ was less common among Scottish 
participants.  
 
Legal rights and discretion 
As well as prompting a focus on self-reliance, the ‘traditional’ conception of power also 
suggests that empowerment can be achieved by reducing the coercive power of service 
providers,  that  is,  their  capacity  to  choose  not  to  meet  the  housing  needs  of  those 
experiencing  homelessness  (or  ‘threaten  continued  deprivation’  in  Lukes’  terminology). 
Reducing the discretion of service providers through formal rules, including law, offers one 
means to reduce their coercive power. This section thus considers the difference legal rights 
make to the discretion of those working with homeless men in Scotland and Ireland.    9 
 
In  Dublin,  a  range  of  considerations  came  to bear  in  service  providers’  decisions  about 
when, how and whether a homeless person  would access settled housing. First, service 
users’ ‘readiness’ for a settled tenancy was considered: ‘we wouldn’t give a unit where we 
felt  really  he  wasn’t  able  to  look  after  himself…  we’d  take  the  recommendation  from 
[temporary accommodation staff] to say yes, he can manage it’ (Accommodation provider, 
Dublin). Where providers felt an individual still wanted ‘to enjoy life and get up to mischief’ 
(Service provider, Dublin) or hadn’t addressed the issues the provider saw as causing their 
homelessness (e.g. substance use), they were unlikely to seek to rehouse them immediately. 
Second,  access  to  social  housing  is  subject  to  ‘estate  management  checks’  establishing 
whether the homeless person has a criminal record. Results are used at the discretion of 
housing  managers,  but  in  practice,  a  criminal  record  weighs  heavily  against  chances  of 
accessing a tenancy. These dynamics were reflected in the perspectives of homeless men, 
who saw their time in temporary accommodation as ‘sort of a trial… to see who’s worthy of 
getting [move-on accommodation] and who’s pulling their socks up… putting the effort in’ 
(Hostel resident, Dublin). Third, considerations of social mix loomed large, with housing 
managers reluctant to rehouse homeless men in areas considered to be ‘saturated’ with 
such residents or where existing residents were known to actively resist such allocation 
decisions.  
 
These concerns regarding ‘housing readiness’, desert, social mix and local reactions are not 
explicitly articulated in the Irish policy framework. Indeed, at the strategic level there is an 
emphasis  on  ‘housing-led’  responses  to  homelessness.  However,  those  administering 
homelessness  policy  had  the  discretion  to  bring  these  criteria  into  play.  These 
considerations thus provided a means of prioritising between homeless people in a context 
of limited resources. In Scotland, legal obligations – by minimising discretion – provided 
some tension pulling policy and practice closer together. 
 
Scotland’s  statutory  homelessness  framework  enforces  a  focus  on  meeting  homeless 
people’s need for settled housing above other potential policy objectives (Watts, 2013). All 
applicants found to be unintentionally homeless are owed the ‘full duty’ to be rehoused. 
Local  authorities’  legal  duties  are  publicly  stated,  enforceable  (via  internal  reviews  and 
ultimately the courts) and subject to regulation and monitoring. The clarity of the Scottish 
approach was clear from participants’ accounts:  
 
the government are quite clear to all local authorities: this is exactly what you have to provide 
and what you have to do (Service provider, Edinburgh) 
 
people  are  clear  on  or  can  be  made  clear  on  what  their  rights  are  and  that…  forces  local 
authorities to deal equitably with homeless people (Service provider, Edinburgh). 
 
While housing officers must still make judgements to interpret rules, the simplicity of the 
statutory  framework  minimises  their  discretion  (see  Donnison,  1977  on  the  distinction 
between judgement/discretion). Scotland’s legal rights-based approach thus imposes tight 
parameters  on  providers’  decisions,  thereby  –  returning  to  the  mechanisms  of  power 
identified above – minimising their ‘coercive power’ and empowering service users.  
   10 
Minimising discretion thus appears to empower homeless households by providing a blunt, 
but effective tool to prioritise their housing needs (Watts, 2013). Minimising discretion may 
have disadvantages, however (Titmuss, 1971). For instance, one Edinburgh hostel resident 
commented that services could be impersonal: ‘I was just another person… they could’ve 
been a bit more supportive’. This kind of sentiment was less evident in Dublin, where service 
users were often very positive about their interactions with providers (see below). This may 
reflect that Irish providers have stronger motivation to build supportive relationships with 
services users: such relationships make a more significant difference than in Scotland, where 
legal rights define access to accommodation.  
    
Legal rights and ‘radical’ approaches  
Lukes’  three-dimensional  view  of  power  directs  attention  to how  people’s  ‘perceptions, 
cognitions  and  preferences’  (Lukes,  2005:  28)  are  shaped.  Bourdieu’s  complimentary 
concept of ‘habitus’ offers a lens for understanding how social structures and contexts, 
through past experiences lead to durable ‘internalized dispositions’ (Brubaker, 2004: 43) for 
people to think, feel and act in particular ways. This section considers how the contrasting 
legal  rights  and  ‘social  partnership’  frameworks  in  Scotland  and  Ireland  impact  on  the 
discourses within which homeless men and service providers understand homelessness and 
their dispositions and ‘habitus’. This study points to substantial differences between Ireland 
and Scotland in this regard, suggesting that a framework of legal rights may help promote a 
particular kind of ‘habitus’ among homeless single men. 
 
Scottish homeless men tended to articulate a sense of entitlement to help, seeing their use 
of  public  resources  as  legitimate.  As  Lewis  and  Smithson  argue  in  a  different  context, 
‘statutory  rights…  become  internalised  as  a  sense  of  entitlement’  (2001:  1477;  Parsell, 
2011).  Homelessness  was  viewed  as  a  matter  of  social  injustice  not  just  personal 
responsibility: ‘Everybody in Britain has a right to accommodation… society is wrong where 
people sleep on the street… I think it’s ridiculous that people are homeless’ (Service user, 
Edinburgh).  Furthermore,  those  working  in  the  sector  saw  this  sense  of  entitlement  as 
justified, even desirable: ‘there is a sense of people knowing that if they’re homeless, they 
can  expect  a  service  provided  to  them…  and  I  think  that’s  an  advantage’  (National 
stakeholder, voluntary sector, Scotland). Another agreed: ‘If there’s a view… that *service 
users]  are  getting  a  bit  more  angsty,  then  fantastic!’’  (National  stakeholder,  voluntary 
sector, Scotland).  
 
This sense of legitimate entitlement tended to go alongside higher expectations about the 
quality  of  services  and  facilities  they  should  have  access  to  (an  older  long-term  rough 
sleeper in Edinburgh with complex needs was an exception who did not appear to feel a 
sense  of  entitlement  to  assistance).  These  expectations  manifested  in  most  cases  in  an 
assertive set of dispositions towards staff. In addition, homeless men in Edinburgh described 
feeling  ‘in  limbo’  in  temporary  accommodation  and  were  impatient  to  access  settled 
housing:  ‘I’m  just  champing  at  the  bit,  ready  to  go’  (Service  user,  Edinburgh).  Another 
described  how  everyday  felt  ‘like  a  waste,  cos  I  could’ve  been  doing  something  more 
constructive’. Overall, the dispositions and discourses among homeless men in Edinburgh 
revealed  a  sense  in  which  they  viewed  themselves  and  were  viewed  as  entitled  rights-
holders (albeit that their sense of moral entitlement didn’t always accurately reflect their   11 
legal entitlements). These findings support the suggestion that the violation of a sense of 
entitlement may prompt a ‘motivation to seek change’ (Major, 1994: 299).  
 
In  contrast,  Irish  homeless  men  tended  to  emphasise  their  luck,  gratitude  and  relief  at 
receiving assistance. Service users were accepting of – even positive about – their situation 
in temporary accommodation: ‘this is like excellent… I’m glad to be here…it’s a good place 
to get breathing space, I can’t knock it really’ (Service user, Dublin). Another hostel resident 
went further, explaining ‘where I am here, is perfect’.  It is important to note that this 
satisfaction did not  reflect objectively higher standards of temporary accommodation in 
Dublin compared to Edinburgh, but rather, it seemed, lower expectations (Watts, 2013). 
Even when there was dissatisfaction, this did not translate into assertiveness: ‘I was told a 
couple of times to put complaints in… and I wouldn’t. I’m not that type, I don’t know what it 
is, but I just didn’t feel I was entitled to it’ (Service user, Dublin). These tendencies went 
alongside a stronger sense than in Edinburgh that moving on from homelessness is a matter 
of personal responsibility and that staff ‘haven’t got a magic wand’:  
 
if I’ve got any fault… it’s towards meself, because I should’ve been personally linking in myself… 
it’s not the staff’s fault… to a very large degree it’s what you do and say, so no, I’ve got no 
qualms… I’ve not been pushing it as hard as I should have (Service user, Dublin). 
 
This translated into a lack of support for legal rights to housing for some: ‘Why should there 
be a legal right for people to be housed? You should work towards it’ (Service user, Dublin). 
These  passive  and  grateful  dispositions  among  homeless  men  in  Dublin  and  the  more 
individualistic  discourses  around  homelessness  reveal  a  sense  in  which  homeless  men 
viewed themselves and were viewed as grateful supplicants, not entitled rights-holders. 
Arguably, this ‘depressed sense of entitlement’ serves ‘to perpetuate and maintain social 
inequality’, rather than challenge it (O’Brien and Major, 2009: 430).  
 
Of  course,  the  dispositions  identified  as  dominant  in  Scotland  and  Ireland  were  not 
uniformly or systematically held by participants in each jurisdiction, and the strength of this 
sense of entitlement and associated attitudes varied within, as well as between Edinburgh 
and Dublin. It should also be noted that these differences in dispositions and discourses 
between  Scotland  and  Ireland  may  not  only  –  or  primarily  –  arise  from  the 
presence/absence  of  legal  rights,  but  will  also  reflect  broader  socio-cultural  and  socio-
political  factors,  namely,  Scotland’s  'social  democratic'  leanings  (see  Mooney  and  Scott 
(2012) for a detailed, if contentious, account) and Ireland’s ‘conservative individualism’ (see 
Coakley, 2005). Nonetheless, the evidence presented suggests that Scotland’s legal rights 
tend to bolster the development of a more assertive and less quiescent ‘habitus’ among 
those experiencing homelessness, who are therefore ready to articulate claims against the 
state, and ‘empowered’ in terms of ‘radical’ views of power. As this assertiveness was seen 
as  legitimate  by  service  providers,  legal  rights  can  be  understood  as  a  form  of  state-
sponsored symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1972/1977), conferred on an otherwise ‘capital poor’ 
group (McNaughton, 2008). Structuring welfare interactions in terms of legal rights makes 
more transparent that these interactions are power situations which involve conflicts of 
interest.  This  framing  appears  to  support  a  more  oppositional  (Prior,  2009)  or  radical 
(Hoggett, 2001) form of agency among those experiencing homelessness. Whereas Irish 
service users saw providers as ‘doing their best’, those in Scotland recognised the power   12 
and  resources  at  the  disposal  of  providers  and  were  correspondingly  more  demanding, 
reflecting perhaps a capacity on their part to ‘objectivize’ their situation (Hilgers, 2009). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
There are contradictory perspectives regarding the relationship between legal welfare rights 
and empowerment. On the one hand, legal rights offer to empower marginalised groups, 
ameliorating  socio-economic  inequalities  and  overcoming  some  of  the  disadvantages  of 
discretionary responses to social need. On the other, legal rights are seen to disempower, 
by undermining self-reliance, autonomy and personal responsibility. The latter perspective 
has  gained  ground  in  recent  decades,  prompting  welfare  reforms  underpinned  by  the 
objective of ‘responsibilisation’ that seek to make welfare rights more conditional and less 
inclusive  (Dwyer,  2004).  By  expanding  the  legal  safety-net  for  homeless  households, 
Scotland appears in one sense to have bucked these trends (Pawson and Davidson, 2008; 
Anderson, 2009). By comparing homelessness policy in Scotland and Ireland, this paper has 
sought to contribute to these debates both conceptually and empirically.  
 
A  conceptual  framework  has  been  presented  that  distinguishes  between  various 
understandings of empowerment by drawing on Lukes’ (2005) three-dimensional account of 
power, complemented by Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’. While the ‘traditional’ one- and 
two-dimensional  views  of  power  direct  attention  to  people’s  ability  to  realise  their 
subjective interests, ‘radical’ views foreground that there may be a difference between a 
person’s subjective preferences and ‘real interests’. Such views direct attention to people’s 
internalised dispositions to perceive situations and act in particular ways. 
 
Scotland’s framework of legal rights appears to empower those experiencing homelessness 
in both the ‘traditional’ and ‘radical’ senses. In the ‘traditional’ sense,  the discretion of 
service providers is minimised within a legal framework that enforces a focus on meeting 
the needs of homeless households for settled housing by crowding out competing policy 
objectives. In the radical sense, legal rights appear to often be internalised as a sense of 
legitimate entitlement to support and a more assertive set of dispositions. Homeless men 
are cast as entitled rights-holders, not grateful supplicants. While it might be to overstate 
the case that homeless men in Scotland displayed ‘radical’ agency (Hoggett, 2001), they did 
tend to adopt a more ‘oppositional’ stance to service providers and be able to reflect on 
their situation ‘from the outside’ (Hilgers, 2009), in a way that empowered them relative to 
their Irish counterparts.  
 
The ‘habitus’ associated with being homeless in Scotland thus appeared to conform to the 
ideal of an ‘active’ ‘responsibilised’ welfare subject to a greater extent than that in Ireland, 
where an absence of legal rights – and emphasis on personal responsibility – appeared to 
weigh  those  experiencing  homelessness  down,  encouraging  them  to  accept  their  lot. 
Although professionals in the sector were concerned that legal rights constrain people’s 
autonomy, by enabling homeless men to pursue a realisable aspiration to access settled 
housing and ‘get back to normal’, Scotland’s legal rights appeared in fact to promote, rather 
than undermine, self-reliance. In Ireland, where homeless men face considerable barriers to 
accessing settled housing, reliance on homelessness services was often accepted. This raises 
the normative question of whether it is desirable for those experiencing homelessness to   13 
have a sense of entitlement. Such an outlook tends to be seen as problematic if it dulls 
incentives to be self-reliant, but as argued here, this may not to be the case.  
 
These conclusions further suggest that approaches to empowerment that rest entirely on 
extending service users’ ‘voice and choice’ (Clarke, 2005: 449) are insufficient. Within the 
conceptual terrain that Lukes and Bourdieu offer, the subjective or expressed preferences of 
service users (especially those who may have a depressed sense of entitlement) should not 
be assumed to be synonymous with their ‘real interests’. Thus equating empowerment with 
participatory approaches may be argued to offer only a partial and impoverished account of 
empowerment (see Nussbaum, 2000 and Hoggett, 2001), albeit that the concept of 'real 
interests' must always be handled with care, and reflexivity (see above).  
 
The comparison between Scotland and Ireland presented here has distilled a largely positive 
'story' regarding the empowering potential of legal rights to housing for homeless people. 
However, caution is required in assuming that the apparently empowering outcomes of the 
Scottish 'model' will be replicated elsewhere if legal rights to housing are established for 
homeless people.  These encouraging Scottish outcomes rely not only on the existence of 
these  rights  but  also  their  form;  namely  their  simplicity  and  bluntness.  This  stands  in 
contrast not only to the opacity of processes and contingency of outcomes observed in 
Ireland's non rights-based system, but also to the highly selective statutory homelessness 
system  in  the  rest  of  the  UK  (Hunter,  2010),  and  to  the  reportedly  administratively 
cumbersome French ‘DALO’ (Houard and Lévy-Vroelant, 2013; Loison-Leruste and Quilgars, 
2009). It is at least arguable then, whether these other legal rights-based approaches have 
the  same  ‘empowering’  effects  as  the  Scottish  model.  Nonetheless,  the  experience  in 
Scotland demonstrates the potential for clear and simple legal rights to minimise provider 
discretion, ‘crowding out’ non-needs related considerations in responding to homelessness, 
as  well  as  to  enhance  the  assertiveness  of  service  users,  and  reinforce  the  perceived 
legitimacy of this assertiveness among service providers. Moreover, it seems to achieve this 
without fatally undermining self-reliance, and indeed may be argued to support self-reliance 
rather better than the highly discretionary Irish model. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to thank all of the participants in the research on which this article is based and the 
ESRC for funding my doctoral research. I am also grateful to Suzanne Fitzpatrick, Sarah 
Johnsen, Cameron Parsell and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this article. All the usual disclaimers apply.  
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Exercising power through force (the removal of choice) is excluded from the analysis. Empowering those who 
are homeless by reducing influence and/or authority are not considered here as similar themes are covered 
under ‘radical’ views of power. 
2 See Baptista (2010) for a review of the distinct nature of women’s homelessness and a review of relevant 
research.  
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